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Three Strikes and You’re Out: Louisiana’s Alternative 
Fuel Usage Tax Credit Whiffs Tax Policy . . . Again 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Louisiana Legislature—keeping up with the nation’s 
“green” movement—enacted Louisiana Revised Statute 47:6035, a 
refundable tax credit for conversion of vehicles to alternative fuel 
usage (CVAF).1 By enacting the CVAF, the legislature attempted to 
incentivize both individuals and corporations “to invest in qualified 
clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property,” with the goal of reducing 
polluting emissions.2 What was initially meant as a boon for 
Louisiana citizens actually created an unintended loophole for certain 
vehicles, while costing Louisiana an estimated $200 million in 
revenue over the CVAF’s lifetime.3 
Specifically, the problem was whether flex-fuel vehicles, those 
propelled by a blend of conventional and alternative fuels such as 
ethanol, qualify for the credit.4 By default, most flex-fuel vehicles 
have the ability to be propelled by gasoline or diesel.5 As a result, 
taxpayers could elect the credit for vehicles that may never actually 
employ alternative fuels, thus creating the possibility for a tax 
benefit without an investment in alternative fuels.6 
In 2012, taxpayers petitioned the Louisiana Department of 
Revenue to clarify whether flex-fuel vehicles were eligible for the 
credit, resulting in a ruling—which has since been repealed—stating 
that flex-fuel vehicles did qualify, and further, that the CVAF creates 
a “rebuttable presumption” that any alternative fuel vehicle listed on 
the Louisiana Department of Energy’s website would qualify for the 
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 1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035 (2009) (amended 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Richard Reed, Alt-Fuel Vehicles Star In Louisiana's Latest Political 
Drama, GREEN CAR REPORTS (June 25, 2012), http://www.greencarreports. com 
/news/1077222_louisianas-latest-political-drama-involves-alt-fuel-vehicles, archived 
at http://perma.cc/RZ92-WA89. 
 4. See Alternative Fuel Conversion, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa 
.gov/ otaq/consumer/fuels/altfuels/altfuels.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/YUF5-SGQL. 
 5. See Flex-Fuel Vehicles, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/ 
fed/flextech.shtml (last modified Feb. 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2HCB-
Y9AU. 
 6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2013). 




credit.7 This ruling was met with cataclysmic opposition by Governor 
Bobby Jindal, which was directed at Louisiana’s then Secretary of the 
Department of Revenue.8 To resolve this obvious loophole, thus 
limiting Louisiana’s exposure to revenue loss, the executive branch 
issued its own ruling, which repealed the ruling by Department of 
Revenue and set forth a solution: The CVAF would only be available 
for flex-fuel vehicles with separate fuel storage and delivery systems 
for the alternative fuel and without the ability to be propelled by 
gasoline or diesel.9 Adhering to the executive branch’s scheme, the 
legislature amended the CVAF to exclude from the credit’s 
qualification vehicles that possess the capability to be propelled by 
both gasoline and an alternative fuel.10 The effect of the amendment 
was to restrict the scope of potential vehicles qualifying for the 
CVAF—and the population of taxpayers realistically eligible for 
qualifying for the credit—in such a way that the CVAF is now 
discordant with the reason for its enactment. This amendment was a 
knee-jerk reaction to a single problem, made without proper analysis 
of applicable law or policy. 
There are numerous issues surrounding the amendment to 
Louisiana’s poorly enacted incentive device, particularly when a tax 
policy analysis is performed, which specifically identifies efficiency 
and equity issues. Additionally, Louisiana’s lack of alternative 
fueling stations is a disincentive to purchase cost-intensive 
alternative fuel vehicles, and the CVAF alone is insufficient as a 
counterbalance.11 Furthermore, realistic application indicates the 
CVAF’s regressive nature. Therefore, the CVAF’s amendment fails 
to correct its true problems, especially when considering the 
implications of tax policy. 
By addressing the critical aspects of proper tax policy and 
formation, this comment argues that the CVAF is not viable as an 
incentive device to reduce polluting emissions because it is 
inequitable and inefficient. Layering the discussion of proper tax 
                                                                                                             
 7. LA. DEPT. REV., INFO. BULL. NO. 12-025 (REPEALED), http://www.rev.state 
.la.us/LawsPolicies/RIB%2012-025.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/59HF-QA5T 
(flex-fuel vehicles were listed on the website). 
 8. The controversy surrounding the CVAF eventually led to the resignation of 
the Secretary of the Department of Revenue only one day after Governor Jindal’s 
opposition. State’s revenue secretary abruptly resigns after rule on tax breaks 
rejected, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 15, 2012), http://www.nola.com/politics 
/index.ssf/2012/06/states_revenue_secretary_abrup.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/PX5E-EVAK. 
 9. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61. I, § 1913 (2012). 
 10. 2013 La. Acts 219. 
 11. See Alternative Fuels Data Center, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc 
.energy.gov/locator/stations/, archived at http://perma.cc/AR3W-ARZP (last updated 
June 4, 2014). 




policy with a comparison of how other jurisdictions have approached 
this issue, this comment blueprints how equity and efficiency within a 
tax scheme must factor into the development of a tax credit. This 
comment examines whether these types of tax credits are sensible, 
using Louisiana’s CVAF as an example. 
Part I of this comment explains the background for current local 
and national policy regarding alternative energy sources and the 
reduction of polluting emissions. Then, Part II outlines Louisiana’s 
CVAF and its 2013 amendment. Part III presents a discussion of the 
tax policy behind the enactment of tax credits within a tax scheme, 
and Part IV of this comment compares different ways of instituting 
incentive devices to promote alternative fuel usage and discusses 
other options to accomplish the policy behind the CVAF. Part V of 
this comment discusses the equity implications of Louisiana’s 
current credit, while inquiring into the prudence of tax credits of this 
nature. Finally, Part VI offers an equitable solution to Louisiana’s 
Credit by applying ideas discussed throughout this comment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Pollution is a global phenomenon;12 specifically, difficult issues 
exist regarding air pollution.13 The best remedy to combat 
pollution’s harmful effects on health, the environment, and property 
is widely debated.14 Domestically, the national policy of the United 
States is that pollution should be prevented, and if impossible to 
completely prevent, it should, at the very least, be reduced at the 
source.15 In stressing this policy, Congress further informs that 
pollution source reduction is essentially different than, and 
preferential to, the mere management and control of pollution.16 
Preventing pollution at the outset affords vital economic and health 
benefits, among other things.17 Here, the adage of “an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure” is illustrative of the United 
States’ policy on pollution prevention—eliminate the source of 
                                                                                                             
 12. Forms of pollution include air, water, noise, land, radioactive, and 
thermal; however, this comment focuses on air pollution, specifically air 
pollution from vehicles. 
 13. See What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/, archived at http://perma.cc/WK8M-AHRM (last 
updated Dec. 22, 2014). 
 14. See id. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2012). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(4) (2012). 
 17. “[P]ollution never created avoids the need for expensive investments in 
waste management or cleanup.” Pollution Prevention, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http: 
//www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/laws.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2RG4-9M3A (last 
updated Feb. 16, 2012). 




pollution outright, if possible, rather than implementing procedures 
that only mitigate a source’s pollution—yet the real issue is 
discovering what type of prevention works best. 
A. Effects of Air Pollution  
The World Health Organization estimates that two million 
premature deaths are caused by air pollution annually.18 Each year in 
the United States alone, 50,000 to 100,000 deaths are attributed to 
air pollution.19 Air pollution harms humans by causing illnesses, 
which include cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, as well as 
many forms of cancer.20 The negative effects of air pollution can be 
seen through climate change and the reduction of the Earth’s ozone 
layer. Climate change, which can be attributed partially to air 
pollution,21 negatively impacts health. Higher global temperatures 
could increase summer deaths from heat waves and increase risks of 
drowning, disease, and hunger from flooding.22 Finally, ozone 
depletion, which can also be attributed to air pollution,23 allows 
increased amounts of ultra violet radiation through to the Earth’s 
surface, which significantly increases rates of skin cancer and could 
result in 300,000 new cases of skin cancer each year.24 
                                                                                                             
 18. “Air pollution, which is closely associated with urbanization and 
industrialization in developing countries, seriously impinges on the health of 
children and adults alike . . . For most children in the large cities of developing 
countries, breathing the air may be as harmful as smoking two packs of cigarettes a 
day.” DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
16 (4th ed. 2011) (quoting The World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 
141 (2000)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, LEGAL COMMENTARIES WITH POLICY AND SCIENCE 
CONSIDERATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION AND AIR POLLUTION 88 
(2006). (The different forms of air pollution that cause injury are commonly referred 
to as carcinogens.). 
 21. See HUNTER, supra note 18, at 4. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 6. Like climate change, ozone layer depletion occurs from a higher 
concentration of pollutants, known as chlorofluorocarbons, existing in the 
stratosphere. 
 24. Id. at 6 (for example, rates of skin cancer may increase by two percent 
for every one percent loss in ozone coverage). 




 1. Transportation Sector Emissions25 
The Industrial Revolution’s improvement upon the engine 
created a limitless demand for energy.26 As demand for energy 
increased, polluting emissions created by the consumption of that 
energy increased.27 For example, the transportation sector consumes 
more than a quarter of commercially produced energy,28 and it is the 
fastest growing sector of CO2 emission production.29 Experts 
estimate that the transportation sector will account for over 30% of 
global greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.30 Remarkably, cars alone 
make up half of this sector’s total CO2 emissions.31 
Road transportation presents its own separate concern within the 
transportation sector due to massive increases in the world’s motor 
vehicle fleet.32 Currently, almost 40 million vehicles are produced 
annually, with estimates of nearly one billion vehicles by 2030.33 As 
the transportation sector increases, energy demand increases, which 
creates an endless cycle of producing polluting emissions—for these 
reasons, incentives like the CVAF are enacted in an attempt to 
contest the increasing amounts of vehicle pollution. 
B. “Poverty is The Biggest Polluter”34: Economic Inequality and 
Alternative Fuel Technology 
Reducing pollution and poverty while increasing alternative fuel 
usage are interdependent goals.35 The challenges of poverty may 
drive an environmentally unsustainable use of resources and can 
                                                                                                             
 25. Emissions of the transportation sector are created by cars, trucks, trains, 
boats, airplanes and any other types of vehicles engaging in the transportation of 
humans or things. 
 26. GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 44. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 43. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. “The CO2 emissions from the United States transport[ation] alone sector 
amount to 5% of total global CO2 emissions.” 
 31. Id. 
 32. GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 43. 
 33. Id. 40 million vehicles produced annually represents “more than one new 
car every second.” 
 34. Akash Kapur, Pollution as Another Form of Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/world/asia/09iht-letter.html?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4R83-AA2L (quoting Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the first 
United Nations environmental conference). 
 35. HUNTER, supra note 18, at 20. 




result in pollution.36 For example, the poor cannot always afford the 
newest technology (which is presumably the least polluting), 
specifically alternative fuel vehicles, and must use older vehicles that 
produce much higher levels of polluting emissions. The inability to 
purchase results in the inability to qualify for the CVAF, which is 
only eligible for a taxpayer who purchases alternative fuel 
technology.37 The resulting effect is a total exclusion of a highly 
polluting subset of the population, which, according to the policy of 
the CVAF, one would presume that an effective credit would target. 
Moreover, many non-wealthy, but not impoverished, individuals 
cannot afford to spend their disposable income to reduce their 
pollution, which is especially true regarding high-cost products such 
as vehicles.38 The average cost of an alternative fuel vehicle is higher 
than its gasoline counterpart; however, the real issue is that the 
impoverished cannot afford new cars, period.39 In Louisiana, the 
average median household pre-tax income from 2009 to 2012 was 
$40,660, meaning that, on average, half of the state’s income 
producing drivers earn less than $40,000.40 Accordingly, new 
alternative fuel vehicles are likely out of contention for at least half of 
income producing drivers in Louisiana. 
C. The Push for Alternative Energy Investment 
The use of alternate energy sources, such as clean-burning 
alternative fuels, is one way to prevent pollution at its source.41 
Congress has already instituted many incentives, such as federal 
tax credits,42 to encourage a variety of emission reduction practices 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. “Environmental degradation, in turn, reduces the amount and quality of 
resources available, pushing the poor to use increasingly marginal resources and 
further perpetuating this destructive spiral.” Id. 
 37. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 38. Alternative fuel versions of their gasoline-only counterparts are generally 
$15,000-$20,000 more expensive. See Tara Baukus Mello, Ownership Costs of 
Traditional Versus Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Depart of Energy Calculator Breaks 
Down Pricing, AUTOWEEK (Feb. 3, 2013), http://autoweek.com/article/car-
news/ownership-costs-traditional-versus-alternative-fuel-vehicles-department- 
energy, archived at http://perma.cc/YZ7H-K7LD. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SOC. & ECON. SUPPLEMENTS, 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical 
/houseold/2012/H08B_2012.xls, archived at http://perma.cc/N442-KXLY. 
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). Clean-
burning alternative fuels have comparatively lower polluting emissions than gasoline 
or diesel. 
 42. See generally Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-
Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable 
Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006). 




in the transportation sector because that sector generates a high 
portion of polluting emissions.43 Many states have followed this 
trend by offering their own incentive devices; like, for example, 
Louisiana’s subsidy promoting alternative fuel usage.44 
However, legislation drawn to reduce air pollution through 
incentivizing investment in alternative energies through a tax credit 
will fail—miserably—without properly considering tax and public 
economic policy. As one scholar notes, “Because energy policy is 
made in a political setting, it rarely comports with principles of 
economic or public finance theory, and more often than not, energy 
tax policy may compound existing distortions, rather than correct 
them.”45 
II. LOUISIANA’S TAX CREDIT FOR ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES 
Louisiana originally enacted a tax credit to promote alternative 
fuel usage in 1991.46 However, this credit was much less generous, 
only providing a credit for up to 20% of the cost to convert the 
vehicle to run on alternative fuels or, if the vehicle was purchased 
with the capability to be propelled by alternative fuels from the 
manufacturer, up to a $1,500 credit.47 By enacting the CVAF, 
Louisiana’s legislature reaffirmed its intent to encourage the use of 
alternative fuels as a means to reduce air pollution, while more than 
doubling the amount of the tax credit.48 The legislature chose to 
continue the use of a tax subsidy to incentivize the investment in and 
usage of clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property.49 
A. Mechanics of the CVAF 
Both individual and corporate taxpayers are eligible to qualify 
for the CVAF credit, and the credit is allowed per vehicle to be 
elected against individual or corporate income tax liability.50 
Before earning the CVAF credit, a taxpayer must initially invest in 
                                                                                                             
 43. See GILLESPIE, supra note 20. 
 44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035 (2009) (amended 2013). 
 45. Hymel, supra note 42, at 67 (quoting Salvatore Lazzari, CRS Issue Brief 
for Congress: Energy Tax Policy, at CRS-3, 1 (2005)). 
 46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:38 (repealed 2009). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C), (D) (2009) (amended 2013). 
The credit now provides fifty percent of conversion costs and up to $3,000 for 
vehicles with pre-installed alternative fuel capability. 
 49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(A) (2009) (amended 2013). 
 50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C) (2009) (amended 2013). 




qualified clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property.51 Qualified 
property includes equipment necessary for vehicles to operate on 
alternative fuels, but categorically excludes equipment necessary 
for vehicles to operate on gasoline or diesel.52 When consumed to 
produce energy, alternative fuels result in emissions53 that are 
“comparably lower than emissions from gasoline or diesel and 
which meets or exceeds federal clean air standards.”54 
After qualified property has been purchased, the taxpayer is 
allowed a tax credit of 50% of the “cost of the qualified clean-
burning motor vehicle property.”55 This investment in qualified 
property is determined based on the type of property purchased.56 
The investment amount can be the cost of the purchase and 
installation of necessary equipment to modify a gasoline or diesel 
propelled vehicle into one propelled by an alternative fuel.57 
Alternatively, the investment amount can be the cost of a new 
vehicle that is equipped to be propelled by an alternative fuel, but 
that amount is limited to the portion of the vehicle attributable to the 
propulsion of the alternative fuel.58 However, in situations where a 
taxpayer is unable to, or elects not to determine the exact cost that is 
attributable to such originally equipped property, a taxpayer may 
claim the lesser of ten percent of the total vehicle cost, or $3,000.59 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(3) (2009) (amended 2013). 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). Per the 
statute, alternative fuels “includ[e] but [are] not limited to compressed natural gas, 
liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, biofuel, biodiesel, methanol, ethanol, 
and electricity.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. 
 55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C) (2009) (amended 2013). 
 56. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2) (2009) (amended 2013). If 
possible, each taxpayer would necessarily choose the method of investment resulting 
in the highest credit amount. This allows the taxpayer to maximize the credit’s 
utility, which comports with the incentive nature of this subsidy. 
 57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2013). This 
investment calculation method additionally requires that the qualified property and 
its installation be paid by the vehicle’s owner, the installation must be performed by 
a technician certified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency to 
perform such modifications, and that the motor vehicle to be modified must be 
registered in Louisiana. 
 58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(b) (2009) (amended 2013). Portions 
“attributable to the storage of the alternative fuel, the delivery of the alternative fuel 
to the engine of the motor vehicle, and the exhaust of gases from combustion of the 
alternative fuel [comprise the amount invested], provided the motor vehicle is 
registered in [Louisiana].” 
 59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(D) (2009) (amended 2013). To employ this 
alternate calculation, a credit under subsection (C) must not have been previously 
claimed, provided the vehicle is registered in Louisiana. 




Also, the investment amount may be the cost of the equipment that 
is used to refuel alternative fuel vehicles.60 
Once a taxpayer qualifies, the credit is applied to the final 
amount of income tax liability owed to Louisiana. Generally, only 
taxable income is subject to the income tax, which is calculated by 
subtracting qualified deductions from the taxpayer’s total taxable 
income.61 Income tax liability is determined by applying a tax rate 
to that total taxable income.62 Any credits can then be applied to 
further reduce the taxpayer’s liability.63 Moreover, certain credits 
can be refundable, allowing a taxpayer with refundable credits in 
excess of their tax liability to receive that excess as a cash refund.64 
The CVAF is a refundable tax credit.65 
B. Ending the Abuse: The CVAF’s Loophole and the Legislature’s 
Near-sighted 2013 Amendment 
The CVAF’s definition of alternative fuels, specifically its lack of 
providing a sufficiently narrow definition, opened the door to an 
unapproved and unintended expansion of the credit.66 The initial cost 
of the CVAF for both corporate and individual taxpayers was 
projected at $336,000 over its first two years.67 However, the actual 
lost tax revenue grew exponentially over the CVAF’s first three years 
totaling $27.5 million, with estimated losses in 2013-2014 of another 
$20 million.68 This is significant compared to Louisiana’s 2012 
                                                                                                             
 60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(c) (2009) (amended 2013). Qualified 
alternative fuel delivery equipment includes compression equipment, storage tanks, 
and dispensing units, provided such equipment is installed in Louisiana and no credit 
has been previously claimed on such property. This investment calculation method 
excludes equipment that delivers alternative fuels to vehicles “associated with 
exploration and development activities necessary for severing natural resources from 
the soil or ground.” 
 61. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 42 (2009). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(E) (2009) (amended 2013). 
 66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). The 
CVAF’s definition was an illustrative list of alternative fuels, which essentially 
encompassed any type of alternative fuel including flex-fuels. 
 67. Tax Exemption Budget 2009-2010, LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE 29 (2009), 
http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/publications/TEB(2009).pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/6YDC-HUGE. 
 68. Tax Exemption Budget 2012-2013, LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE 19, 21 (2012), 
http://www.rev.state.la.us/publications/TEB(2012).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc 
/GAT2-FG5R. 




budget deficit of $6,686,217.69 More importantly, these amounts 
represent 11.3% of Louisiana’s average annual revenue loss from all 
tax incentives and exceptions combined over the same period.70 This 
highly unexpected loss of revenue was “fueled” in 2012 by the former 
Secretary of Revenue’s issuance of an emergency declaration 
attempting to define which vehicles were eligible for the CVAF 
credit, which included flex-fuel vehicles,71 the source of the 
loophole.72 At the time of the ruling, the potential impact of this 
loophole on the Louisiana budget was estimated at $200 million.73 In 
an effort to resolve this unintended gap, the executive branch issued a 
ruling to contemporaneously repeal the Louisiana Department of 
Revenue’s ruling and set forth a solution.74 The solution provided that 
the tax credit is only available for flex-fuel vehicles with separate fuel 
storage and delivery systems for the alternative fuel and that are also 
capable of being solely propelled by the alternative fuel.75 Although 
Governor Jindal repealed the emergency declaration, any tax credits 
applied for before the rejection were honored by the Louisiana 
Department of Revenue.76 
                                                                                                             
 69. State Budget 2013-2014, LA. DEP’T. OF REVENUE 1 (2013), http://www.doa 
.louisiana.gov/opb/pub/FY14/StateBudget_FY14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc 
/Q274-XT8X. 
 70. Id. at 11. 
 71. See Flex-Fuel Vehicles, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov 
/feg/flextech.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/2HCB-Y9AU (last modified Feb. 6, 
2015). Flex-fuel vehicles have the ability to be propelled by ethanol blends of fuel, a 
type of alternative fuel, but they can also be fueled by regular gasoline using the 
same fuel storage tank. 
 72. Greg Hilburn, Ruling On Credit Pending, THE NEWS-STAR (July 6, 2012, 
11:36 PM), http://www.thenewsstar.com/article/20120707/NEWS01/207070328 
/Ruling-credit-pending, archived at http://perma.cc/JT7Z-C2ZZ. 
 73. Id. 
 74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61. I, § 1913 (2012). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Hilburn, supra note 72. 
Year CVAF’s Estimated Cost 





Consider this practical application illustrating the loophole caused 
by the CVAF’s vague drafting. After the CVAF’s enactment, a 
corporation maintaining a fleet of vehicles purchases 1,000 new flex-
fuel vehicles, neither expending additional investment into alternative 
fuels nor intending to propel the vehicles solely by alternative fuels. 
The corporation then elects the CVAF for each flex-fuel vehicle 
purchased.78 This results in a credit of $3,000,000,79 yet fails to 
reduce emissions per the CVAF’s policy. Moreover, the corporation 
is not statutorily compelled to use alternative fuel in these flex-fuel 
vehicles. This unforeseen negative effect of the CVAF can be further 
expanded to individuals and any other corporate taxpayers. Further 
complicating the issue is the abundance and reasonableness of the 
price of flex-fuel vehicles in relation to other alternative fuel vehicles. 
Ultimately, each taxpayer purchasing flex-fuel vehicles, whether 
energy and pollution conscience or not, would be entitled to a “free” 
credit to continue using gasoline—thus, a total tax policy 
insufficiency. 80 
The CVAF’s loophole further compounded Louisiana’s already 
problematic budget deficit. The legislature reacted in the 2013 
Louisiana Legislative Session by proposing and subsequently 
amending the CVAF to prevent the subsidy from reducing necessary 
state revenue.81 The amendment essentially excluded flex-fuel 
vehicles from qualifying for the CVAF by adding further restrictions 
to flex-fuel vehicles.82 Under the amended CVAF, flex-fuel vehicles 
                                                                                                             
 77. Once the loophole was discovered, the revenue loss estimates were adjusted 
to project losses based on current the year. 
 78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(D) (2009) (amended 2013). In this 
example, the corporate taxpayer would elect to take the lesser of ten percent or 
$3,000 under subsection (D) of the CVAF. 
 79. ($3,000,000 = $3,000 x 1,000). 
 80. This violates the basic economic policy that there is no such thing as “free 
bread.” The state shoulders a burden in exchange for nothing, which does not further 
any economic principle or policy benefit. 
 81. 2013 La. Acts 219. 
 82. Id. The amendment in its entirety is as follows: 
2009 $ 0 
2010 $ 164,000 
2011 $ 172,000 
2012 – Lifetime77 $ 200 MILLION




can only qualify if the vehicle has only one fuel storage and delivery 
system and no longer retains the ability to be propelled by gasoline 
or diesel.83 The amendment is largely problematic because it focuses 
only on the loophole, which was the immediate threat to the state, 
and completely disregards necessary tax policy considerations that 
must be met in order for a credit to be efficient, equitable, and 
ultimately viable. 
III. TAX POLICY FOR DUMMIES: THE CHALLENGE TO MAINTAIN 
EQUITY & EFFICIENCY 
A proper analysis of Louisiana’s tax credit, or any tax credit, 
requires an understanding of legislative drafting and knowledge of 
how legislators use policy as a tool to promote or regulate activities. 
As a rule, tax theory analysis demands that justice exists among 
taxpayers.84 Justice requires legislatures to continuously strive for a 
balance between the state and its taxpayers. 
As such, a conflict between equity and efficiency lies at the center 
of tax policy.85 In balancing this conflict, justice entails fairness to the 
taxpayer while guarding the state’s overall objective of maximizing 
revenue and minimizing cost.86 Tax credits, as component parts of the 
whole tax scheme, are governed by these same principles.87 
Developing any component of a tax scheme necessitates considering 
not only tax policy but the policy of other interacting areas.88 
                                                                                                             
 
(C)(1)(a) The credit provided for in Subsection A of this Section shall be 
allowed against individual or corporate income tax for the taxable period in 
which the property is purchased and installed, if applicable, and shall be 
equal to fifty percent of the cost of the qualified clean-burning motor 
vehicle property. 
(1)(b) – “Nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize a tax credit 
for the costs of a purchase of, or conversion of a vehicle to, a flexible fuel 
vehicle that is designed to run on an alternative fuel and either petroleum 
gasoline or petroleum diesel if the vehicle has only a single fuel storage 
and delivery system and retains the capability to be propelled by petroleum 
gasoline or petroleum diesel. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See generally Liam Murphy, Taxes, Property, Justice, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 983 (2005). 
 85. Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 
TAX L. REV. 229, 229 (2011). 
 86. Id. When implementing a tax credit, there must be a consideration to 
minimize not only the foregone revenue but also the costs incurred in maintaining 
and servicing the tax credit. 
 87. See id. 
 88. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 323 (1999). 




Consider, for instance, the relationship between tax and public 
economic theory. 
In the field of economic theory, the concept of fairness comprises 
the distribution of the tax burden across society, which is similar to 
justice in tax policy.89 Efficiency, in economic theory, concerns the 
social costs of raising revenue, which again serves as evidence of the 
parallelism between tax and economic policy.90 However, problems 
exist within this seemingly harmonized relationship.91 A tax with a 
desirable distribution of the burden may contemporaneously impose 
costs, among other things.92 Inevitably, legislatures face the perpetual 
challenge of balancing these policy tradeoffs to maximize the efficient 
allocation of resources while avoiding negative effects. 
Because this comment discusses an income tax credit, it is worth 
noting that the income tax plays a pivotal role in the analysis of 
taxation and public economic policy.93 Issues with efficiencies and 
externalities often arise in connection with public economic topics 
like the CVAF.94 The optimal income tax, of which tax credits are a 
component, is efficiently distributed through perfect resource 
allocation.95 
A. Efficiencies and Externalities 
Efficient subsidies directly accomplish their policy goal. To 
accomplish its goal, the CVAF must actually incentivize taxpayers 
to purchase alternative fuel vehicles in order to reduce polluting 
emissions. In reality, perfect allocation of resources rarely occurs, 
which is due to externalities.96 Externalities are positive or 
negative side effects caused by specific activities, which distort the 
actual measure of costs or benefits the activity produces.97 
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Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). 
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 95. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 
63 (1996). 
 96. Id. at 69. 
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Externalities can arise either from the production or consumption 
of goods.98 Tax policy can be used to adjust inefficiencies caused 
by externalities that distort the perfect allocation of resources.99 
The key to maintain this balanced efficiency when using tax policy 
is to limit the government’s action to the extent of the externality. 
Therefore, the CVAF must be measured against the negative 
externality it attempts to correct—air pollution.100 
 1. Negative Externalities 
Negative externalities occur when an actor’s production or 
consumption of a good harms others without compensation for the 
harm caused.101 Within the energy and transportation sectors, 
pollution is the primary example of a negative externality.102 In the 
absence of regulatory intervention, pollution emitting players within 
these sectors are only accountable for their own costs—essentially the 
production process and resulting materials which subsequently emit 
the pollution—while society at large is forced to endure the social and 
environmental costs of the polluter’s activities.103 The government 
could intervene to remedy the negative externality by taxing the 
polluter’s actions104 or by incentivizing pollution reducing 
behavior.105 
Within these sectors, legislatures use tax policy to achieve 
social, economic, environmental, or financial goals consisting 
largely of taxes or subsidies. Taxes imposed discourage specific 
behavior through financial penalties, while subsidies are incentive 
                                                                                                             
 
GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 125 (Leo Kelly, et al. eds., 3rd ed. 
2011). 
 98. For purposes for this comment, only externalities resulting from 
consumption is relevant because the CVAF is a subsidy targeted at consumers of 
vehicles. 
 99. See Zolt, supra note 95. 
 100. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 101. GRUBER, supra note 97, at 124. 
 102. Zolt, supra note 95. For example, consider a city like Chicago that is 
crippled by gridlock during traffic hours by suburban commuters. The local 
residents and businesses suffer the harmful effects of the pollution produced by 
the commuters without reparation by the polluters. This imposes future health 
expenditures on the local citizens. 
 103. Zolt, supra note 95, at 69–70. 
 104. Id. at 70. 
 105. Id. See also A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (1960). 
(English economist Arthur Pigou was the first to advocate using tax policy to 
manage externalities). 




devices that encourage behavior.106 Arguably, subsidization through 
governmental vouchers107 is less efficient than through tax credits 
due to the administrative costs in determining which projects receive 
the voucher.108 However, this is only true where the subsidization is 
relatively equal to the negative externality it attempts to regulate.109 
Louisiana’s CVAF is a subsidy that incentivizes the investment in 
and use of clean-burning alternative fuels in an attempt to regulate air 
pollution, a large-scale negative externality.110 Because the CVAF is 
available for each polluting taxpayer to reduce their emissions, the 
CVAF is efficient in that it is equal in size to the corresponding 
negative externality.111 Perfect implementation of the CVAF should 
correct the market inefficiencies that air pollution causes. 
Ultimately, the CVAF encourages investment in certain assets 
and not others, causing distortionary effects in and of itself.112 In a 
perfect market, any implementation and use of the CVAF is 
efficient, and even beneficial. This result is due to the reduced air 
pollution that alternative fuel vehicles generate, providing benefits 
to the environment and in turn, to peoples’ health. It is 
administratively impossible to evaluate the actual amount of 
pollution reduction the CVAF provides when implemented on an 
individual taxpayer basis. However, some factors that must be 
considered to determine if efficiency really is being accomplished 
by the CVAF include whether a taxpayer’s previous vehicle was 
more polluting and was actually replaced by the new alternative fuel 
vehicle or whether the aggregate reduction in pollution attained by a 
particular taxpayer correlates to the cost of the credit. Other factors 
relating to equity cause the CVAF’s real failures.113 
Therefore, the CVAF might be flawed, yet effective, regarding 
efficiency, and the real question is how to design a better system. 
In short, even though regulated externalities like pollution create 
an inefficient market, legislatures must not assume that the tax 
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system is the only remedial option.114 Corrective taxes impose 
additional concerns, and policy makers should initially compare 
what mechanisms could best address the inefficiencies present, 
whether considering tax or non-tax programs.115 Legislatures must 
consider other solutions that could accomplish the policy goals of 
the CVAF better, void of these inherent issues of tax policy. 
IV. COMPARISON OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES  
Generally,116 the devices used to promote alternative fuel usage 
in a jurisdiction fall within the categories of vouchers, subsidies (a la 
the CVAF), loans and leases, grants, rebates, exemptions, or other 
more narrowly tailored state-specific devices.117 For comparison, 
Louisiana has six such devices, while the federal government has 
47, the highest of any jurisdiction.118 For purposes of this comment, 
only the most prominent devices will be discussed. Regardless of 
the type of device used, the most important aspect is the device’s 
goal and whether that goal is construed narrowly enough. 
A. Devices Relating to the Development of The Alternative Fuel 
Sector 
While the federal government has enacted every type of 
incentive device, the following are most informative for purposes 
of this comment. The Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Tax Credit 
provides that fueling equipment for natural gas, liquefied 
petroleum gas (propane), electricity, ethanol blends, or diesel fuel 
blends containing a minimum of 20% biodiesel, are eligible for a 
tax credit of 30% of the equipment’s cost, but not to exceed 
$30,000.119 Fueling station owners who install qualified equipment 
at multiple sites are allowed to use the credit towards each 
location.120 The credit, limited to $1,000, even extends to those 
                                                                                                             
 114. Zolt, supra note 95, at 70. 
 115. Id. at 70–71. 
 116. This discussion highlights the approach taken by other major jurisdictions in 
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 117. See Alternative Fuels Data Center, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc. 
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consumers purchasing residential fueling equipment.121 Another 
federal tax credit is the Alternative Fuel Excise Tax Credit, which 
is an incentive available for alternative fuel that is sold for use to 
operate a motor vehicle.122  
Texas uses a similar approach. As part of the Texas Emissions 
Reduction Plan,123 alternative fueling infrastructure grants are 
awarded, which provides grants for 50% of eligible costs, up to 
$500,000, to construct, reconstruct, or acquire a facility to store, 
compress, or dispense alternative fuels in areas failing to meet the 
state’s minimum air quality standards.124 Under the infrastructure 
grant, qualified alternative fuels include biodiesel, electricity, natural 
gas, hydrogen, propane, and fuel blends containing at least 85% 
methanol (M85). Importantly, the entity receiving the grant must 
agree to make the fueling station available to people and 
organizations not associated with the grantee during certain times.125 
Texas’s Diesel Fuel Blend Tax Exemption provides that the 
biodiesel or ethanol portion of blended fuel containing taxable diesel 
is exempt from the diesel fuel tax.126 
California has 30 incentive devices; however, notably, the state 
employs zero tax-based alternative fuel incentives.127 The California 
Energy Commission additionally administers the Alternative and 
Renewable Fuel and Vehicle Technology Program to provide 
financial incentives for businesses, vehicle and technology 
manufacturers, workforce training partners, fleet owners,128 
consumers, and academic institutions with the goal of developing and 
deploying alternative and renewable fuels and advanced 
transportation technologies.129 Most importantly, California’s 
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Alternative Fuel Vehicle and Fueling Infrastructure Grants provide 
funding for projects that reduce pollution emissions from vehicles.130 
B. Narrowly Targeted Devices 
Narrowly targeted devices are solutions that use a direct means 
to accomplish their policy goal. The Federal Government instituted 
the Qualified Plug-In Electric Drive Motor Vehicle Tax Credit, 
which provides a tax credit for the purchase of specific electric 
vehicles.131 Texas provides a rebate towards the purchase price of 
alternative fuel vehicles, which includes vehicles propelled by 
compressed natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and electricity.132 
California issues vouchers for the purchase of hybrid electric and 
zero emission vehicles,133 while issuing rebates for plug-in hybrid 
and zero emission light-duty vehicles.134 
C. Common Themes 
Common themes in other jurisdiction include the use of tax 
subsidies, but these jurisdictions generally avoid tax credits simply for 
the general purchase of alternative fuel vehicles. For example, the 
credits for purchase of electric vehicles are sensible because this type 
of vehicle emits zero pollution. The credit is completely efficient in 
that regard while also encouraging investment in that particular 
alternative fuel.135 Furthermore, the drafting of those credits are clear 
and concise, which limits potential loopholes caused by vague, all-
encompassing drafting. Among these jurisdictions, there is significant 
focus to incentivize the establishment of alternative fuel development 
and its infrastructure, with specific incentives aimed toward engaging 
businesses in that development. This allows the public to develop the 
alternative energy sector, rather than the government developing it 
using tax dollars. In contrast, Louisiana has no such infrastructure 
development device other than the CVAF, which is capped at 
$3,000—hardly enough to offset a material amount of infrastructure 
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investment. In that regard, the CVAF is useless. Moreover, a lack of 
alternative fueling stations in Louisiana acts as a disincentive to invest 
in alternative energy, regardless of the CVAF in place. For alternative 
fuel use to be taken seriously, infrastructure must exist. 
V. TAX EQUITY: THE REGRESSIVE NATURE OF THE CVAF 
The concept of fairness in tax theory requires policymakers to 
consider the equity of a tax scheme.136 Inevitably, each individual 
policymaker’s ideals ultimately affect the equity of a tax scheme,137 
and not all policymakers may view the fairness of a tax scheme 
similarly.138 Some policymakers, for example, may disagree that the 
CVAF is fair or even appropriate. 
A. Horizontal and Vertical Equity Application 
Generally, tax equity is comprised of vertical and horizontal 
concepts.139 Vertical equity is the fair distribution of the tax burden on 
people at different income levels, and horizontal equity is fair tax 
treatment of people at the same income level.140 Because eligibility 
for the CVAF requires taxpayers to invest money into alternative fuel 
property, a discussion of vertical equity is more appropriate. 
Accordingly, this section focuses on the fairness of the CVAF’s 
treatment of taxpayers at different income levels. Analysis of the 
CVAF reveals that it is regressive and unfairly beneficial to wealthy 
taxpayers due to the high costs of new alternative fuel technology, 
which is not an equitable result to Louisiana’s average taxpayer. 
A regressive tax scheme decreases the tax rate as the taxable 
base increases, which results in a lack of vertical equity to 
taxpayers with lower taxable bases and should be avoided.141 
While some regressive aspects of a tax scheme can function 
properly, tax credits are generally not among them.142 Tax credits 
return income, which, in the case of the CVAF’s investment 
requirement, benefit wealthy taxpayers much less than non-
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wealthy taxpayers unable to purchase new alternative fuel 
technology. Therefore, a regressive tax credit is one that is more 
accessible to wealthy taxpayers and effectively decreases their tax 
rate through a return of income. 
The purpose of the CVAF is to encourage pollution reduction 
through the use of alternative fuels, not to provide a tax reduction 
device to the wealthy if they invest in alternative fuels. Wealthy 
taxpayers comprise a much smaller segment of society, thus 
comprising a smaller segment of total drivers in the transportation 
sector causing pollution. Realistically, far fewer taxpayers are able 
to elect the CVAF, which is evidence of the regressive nature of 
the credit. However, any reduction of polluting emissions is 
particularly beneficial to low income taxpayers that suffer the 
harmful health consequences of pollution and its attributable health 
care costs. 
Moreover, due to the relationship between poverty and pollution, 
the CVAF is focused towards the group of individual taxpayers 
polluting the least in the transportation sector overall, because wealthy 
taxpayers generally drive new, lower polluting vehicles, instead of 
higher polluting, older ones. Non-wealthy individuals are harmed the 
most due to the polluting emissions of their older gasoline propelled 
vehicles and by being unable to afford brand new alternative fuel 
vehicles. Thus, regarding the vertical equity of non-wealthy 
taxpayers, the CVAF is unfair and undesirable because it only 
benefits the wealthy. 
However, this is not to propose that the CVAF as an incentive 
device is by itself inequitable. Because tax credits are most 
beneficial for non-wealthy taxpayers, the CVAF could be seen as 
an incentive directed at those high polluting individuals to reduce 
their emissions and receive income in return. However, the amount 
of subsidization provided by the CVAF, regardless of income 
levels, creates the high amount of vertical inequity. Greater vertical 
equity would be achieved if the credit were proportioned between 
wealthy and non-wealthy taxpayers. Notably, the higher polluters 
lack the resources required to invest in alternative fuels, which 
makes a tax credit useless as an incentive device. Incentivizing 
pollution reduction in the transportation sector should not be 
performed through a tax credit. 
B. Caveat: The Cash for Clunkers143 Conundrum 
In 2009, Congress authorized the trade-in of older and less fuel-
efficient vehicles in exchange for a voucher worth up to $4,500 to be 
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used toward the purchase of a more fuel-efficient vehicle.144 The 
Cash for Clunkers scheme was designed to remove higher polluting 
vehicles from the nationwide fleet, eliminating the possibility that 
removed vehicles could be resold and return to use.145 To that extent, 
the program allowed the resale of certain parts of the vehicle but 
required that the engine and drivetrain be immobilized, crushed, and 
then scrapped.146 The requirement of the scrapping process resulted in 
additional air pollution and environmental harm that nearly offset the 
program’s benefits relating to emission reduction.147 Therefore, 
devices used to incentivize pollution reduction by removing less-
efficient vehicles from the fleet utilizing a scrapping policy should be 
focused on the highest polluting taxpayers because the polluting 
emissions associated with scrapping equal roughly 10-15% of a 
vehicle’s lifetime emissions.148 One might consider “scrapping” the 
required scrapping policy in lieu of other considerations. For 
example, a threshold level of acceptable polluting emissions could be 
established, and any vehicles involved in such a program that emit 
emissions over that level could be totally scrapped while the 
remainder could be resold with emission modifications. Additionally, 
to the extent efficiencies can be maintained, recycling all aspects of 
the vehicles should be considered.149 
VI. PROPOSALS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
CVAF is an ineffective and inequitable incentive device as a 
means of furthering the policy of reducing polluting emissions from 
vehicles through alternative fuel investment. The credit’s vague 
drafting imposed catastrophic costs upon a state already struggling 
with a budget deficit, which forced the current legislative 
amendment. To better encourage Louisiana taxpayers to reduce their 
vehicles’ polluting emissions, the CVAF should largely be modified 
to balance efficiency and improve vertical equity. First, the CVAF 
should include an annual expenditure cap. Second, the CVAF 
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should include an income phase-out threshold amount and prohibit 
corporate taxpayers from claiming the credit. Finally, the CVAF 
should be implemented as a voucher system to continue 
incentivizing corporate and wealthy individual taxpayers, while also 
allowing the impoverished, who typically pollute the most, to 
become eligible for the incentive. 
A. Annual Cap on the CVAF 
An annual cap of awarded credits would allow the Louisiana 
Legislature to limit the exact amount of forgone revenue the state is 
willing to risk. This cap would limit the exposure to loss caused by 
the abuse of the CVAF’s vague drafting. The CVAF’s amendment 
merely shut the door to one source of abuse, while leaving open the 
potential for future abuse with other forms of alternative energy 
vehicles. Louisiana should use the legislature’s initial CVAF cost 
projections as a template for the amount of the cap. 
B. Income Phase-out 
Including an income phase-out for the CVAF would prevent 
abuse by a significant number of taxpayers. This would result in 
achieving greater vertical equity. Because tax credits return income 
to taxpayers in greater need of the return based on public policy, a 
threshold phase-out is proper to prevent the return of income to 
wealthy taxpayers, which is an unnecessary drain from state 
revenue. It is common and perfectly sound policy for tax credits to 
include phase-out provisions. Moreover, a phase-out would affect a 
non-material number of polluting individual taxpayers, due to the 
distribution of wealth. The threshold would eliminate wasting any 
of the capped amount of the credit from being awarded to those 
wealthy taxpayers. 
C. Voucher System 
A voucher system provides maximum efficiency of the CVAF. 
Vouchers must be applied for and approved by the government. 
Appropriately, a cap on the total cash amount of vouchers annually 
awarded would prevent the CVAF from being a categorically 
granted incentive. Limited voucher funds forces the state to 
thoroughly consider each applicant, selecting those that would 
achieve the greatest reduction of polluting emissions, which 
corresponds with the CVAF’s policy goal. 
Corporate and wealthy taxpayers would remain incentivized to 
invest in alternative fuels by being eligible for the CVAF vouchers, 




which is an equitable solution to their ineligibility under the credit 
aspect of the CVAF. The state would award more vouchers to 
corporations with large fleets of vehicles, taking into consideration 
the amount of miles driven by the fleet and reducing the voucher 
amount awarded for vehicles that are driven minimally.150 Wealthy 
individual taxpayers would be similarly considered. Vouchers 
would be awarded to the highest polluting taxpayers, which 
follows the CVAF’s policy and is a component of efficiency. Low 
income individuals are categorically prohibited from eligibility 
under the current CVAF due to the high cost of alternative fuel 
technology. Because this class typically creates the most polluting 
emissions per driver, the state could issue vouchers to the 
applicants where an alternative fuel vehicle would result in the 
greatest polluting emission reduction, taking into consideration the 
nature and extent of the individual’s use of their vehicle. More 
consideration should be given to low income individuals in this 
class using their own vehicle to make a living that requires driving 
many miles, which results in the most pollution. 
Arguably, however, wealthy individual taxpayers would be 
given higher voucher priority over low income individuals, but 
independently from corporate taxpayers, due to the actual 
investment in alternative fuel technology made by those individuals. 
This comment neither concerns itself with that issue, nor reaches 
that conclusion. Ultimately, the greatest benefits of a voucher 
system include the ability for the state to issue the vouchers on a 
case by case basis and increasing eligibility of low income 
individuals by removing the economic barriers of the CVAF while 
avoiding the unnecessary return of income to wealthy taxpayers. 
These benefits greatly increase the efficiency and fairness of the 
CVAF. 
D. Local Action the Best Implementation Strategy? 
If reducing emissions is a major policy consideration, some 
proponents recommend that the bulk of regulatory action be taken 
by parish/county or city-level governments—i.e. local action.151 
This is evidenced in jurisdictions such as California,152 a pioneer of 
promoting alternative fuel technology. Local action could be 
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initiated and implemented more quickly than the slower legislative 
speed of state and federal government.153 As a result of this quick 
implementation, state and federal governments could use each 
locality’s implementations as policy experiments that provide 
evidence on how best to draft similar legislation.154 Moreover, 
local authorities are more aware of, and may more easily identify, 
pollution issues within their own jurisdiction.155 However, local 
action has been met with criticism. The most predominant 
criticisms include local governments’ lack of financial resources 
and their officials’ lack of sufficient expertise and knowledge in 
pollution regulation or alternative fuels.156 Thus, this comment 
does not advocate local action as a solution, but instead wishes to 
identify the potential increase of the voucher’s efficiency while 
assigning its administrative cost proportionally if implemented 
locally, rather than state-wide. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the CVAF’s amendment corrected one glaring 
problem with the subsidy, the legislature overlooked the credit’s real 
issues under a tax theory analysis: flawed efficiency and inequity. 
These issues can be fixed, and the CVAF’s policy furthered, by 
imposing an annual limit and an income phase out threshold on the 
subsidy. Furthermore, the CVAF should include a provision 
implementing a voucher system similar to other jurisdictions. This 
would increase the eligibility of corporate taxpayers and individuals 
of any income level, which results in greater equity while focusing 
on most efficiently achieving the legislature’s policy goals. By 
implementing these solutions, Louisiana can maintain a viable 
incentive device; otherwise, the CVAF is a regressive tax credit that 
fails to accomplish its goal. 
Timothy McGibboney∗ 
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